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COMPELLED TO TESTIFY: AN EVALUATION OF
32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 AND THE PRIVILEGE FOR MAINE
LICENSED CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKERS
Juliana Kirkland O’Brien*
I. INTRODUCTION
The mental health industry is big business: the National Institute of Mental
Health reports that in 2012, 43.7 million people ages eighteen and older (18.6% of
U.S. adults) experienced issues associated with a mental illness.1 In Maine, about
51,000 adults and approximately 13,000 children suffer from a serious mental
illness.2 According to the World Health Organization, mental illness “accounts for
more disability in developed countries than any other group of illnesses, including
cancer and heart disease”3 and in Maine, mental health issues coupled with
substance abuse is the leading cause of disability and death for Mainers between
ages fifteen and forty-four, and is the second leading cause of disability among all
ages.4
While many people experience a mental health issue at some point in their
lives, upwards of eighty percent can maintain “normal, productive lives” if they
have access to effective treatment.5 However, unlike medical issues that can be
diagnosed with a blood test or biopsy, mental health diagnosis and treatment
depends largely on the patient’s disclosures to mental health professionals.
Psychotherapy is an example of an effective mental health treatment for
anxiety disorders, mood disorders, addictions, eating disorders, and personality
disorders.6 In addition, psychotherapy can be helpful for individuals looking to
relieve stress, resolve conflict, and deal with other difficult life issues.7 In an
attempt to help individuals manage or overcome their mental health issues,
psychotherapists encourage patients to articulate their thoughts, urges, and
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maine School of Law. I would like to thank Professors
Deirdre Smith, Peter Guffin and Elizabeth Stout for their valuable feedback and guidance, the Maine
Law Review editors and staff for their hard work in the editing process, as well as my family and friends
for their unyielding support.
1. Any Mental Illness (AMI) among Adults, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/any-mental-illness-ami-among-adults.shtml (last
visited Nov. 2, 2014) (“As noted, these estimates of AMI do not include substance use disorders, such as
drug- or alcohol-related disorders.”).
2. State Statistics: Maine, NAMI STATE ADVOCACY 2010, https://www.nami.org/
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm?ContentFileID=93497 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
3. John M. Grohol, CDC Statistics: Mental Illness in the US, PSYCHCENTRAL (Sept. 4, 2011),
http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2011/09/03/cdc-statistics-mental-illness-in-the-us/.
4. The Tipping Point: Mental Health in Maine 2010, NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS
(NAMI), http://www.nami.org/Content/Microsites186/NAMI_Maine/Home174/Welcome_to_NAMI_
Maine1/Updatedthetippingpoint-communitymentalhealthinmaine(2).pdf 5 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
5. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Service: Message, MAINE.GOV, http://www.maine.gov/
dhhs/samhs/mentalhealth/message.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
6. Tests and Procedures: Psychotherapy, MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.org
/tests-procedures/psychotherapy/basics/why-its-done/prc-20013335.
7. Id.
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concerns in a safe, confidential therapeutic session.
Today, “psychotherapy” encompasses many professional subsets, including
psychiatrists, psychologists, and licensed clinical social workers (LCSWs). Patients
seeking mental health services can choose between a variety of professionals for
similar mental health treatment, although LCSWs are usually more affordable than
other licensed mental health workers.8 In addition, the professional outlook for
social work is projected to increase by 19% between 2012 and 2022.9 Therefore
LCSWs will have an amplified ability to impact society and the individual patient
through their increased professional outreach.10
While LCSWs have not always been considered psychotherapists that require
the same legal protections as the other classifications, the laws have adjusted to
include LCSWs due to the fact the profession provides a “significant amount of
mental health treatment.”11 Given the important role that psychotherapy plays in
society, there are several duties and laws in place that delicately balance between
offering privacy to the patient, and protecting the public from dangerous situations.
In 1977, at a time where the Maine Rules of Evidence did not provide a
privilege for social workers, the Maine State Legislature enacted 32 M.R.S.A.
§ 7005—a licensing statute that also gives a conditional privilege for social
workers.12 This provision is considered “conditional” because it exists unless an
individual’s “physical or mental condition” is at issue, or a court decides the
provision does not further the interest of justice.13
In 2008, the Maine Rules of Evidence expanded to include LCSWs into the
full protections of the state psychotherapist-patient privilege.14 However, 32
M.R.S.A. § 7005, and its conditional exception remain and, due to the hierarchy of
the laws, still governs. Therefore, while it appears that Maine LCSWs are
protected under the Maine Rules of Evidence, an antiquated statute provides an
exception to this protection.
In 2013, the Maine District Court (Biddeford, Douglas, J.) applied this statute
in a Protection From Abuse (PFA) context, and held that, despite the Rules of
Evidence, a clinical social worker could be compelled to testify at a PFA hearing in
which a potential victim sought legal protection from a family member, based upon
an alleged homicidal threat made in a psychotherapy session.15 The court relied on
32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 to compel the testimony. Such an exception has been termed
“the dangerous-patient exception” because the enumerated privilege would give
way in the event that the patient posed a danger to another individual.16
As it now stands, patients of Maine LCSWs are not as protected as the Maine
8. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1996).
9. Social Workers Job Outlook, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK
(Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/community-and-social-service/social-workers.htm#tab-6.
10. See
Licensed
Clinical
Social
Worker
–
LCSW,
HUMAN SERVICES EDU.,
http://www.humanservicesedu.org/licensed-clinical-social-worker-lcsw.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
11. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15.
12. 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 (1999 & Supp. 2013).
13. Id.
14. State of Maine Supreme Judicial Court; Amendments to the Maine Rules of Evidence, COURT
RULES (July 7, 2008) http://www.cleaves.org/2008Me.Rules10.pdf.
15. Donaldson v. Donaldson, No. PA-13-287 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Aug. 19, 2013).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2000).
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Rules of Evidence would suggest, and 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 threatens not only the
legal protections afforded to these patients, but also the fundamental concepts that
provide for effective mental health treatment. This article argues that 32 M.R.S.A.
§ 7005 must be amended to acknowledge and mirror the expanded protections
given to LCSWs under the Maine Rules of Evidence, and recommends that, until
the Statute is addressed, Maine courts limit their discretion under the Statute to
only extreme circumstances, such as an imminent threat of harm against another
individual.
Part II discusses the protections that are in place for psychotherapy patients
designed to encourage individuals to seek and receive effective mental health
treatment. This includes the ethical duty of confidentiality and the psychotherapistpatient privilege. Part III examines the exceptions in place to protect the public
against dangerous patients. Part IV examines the issues that Maine LCSWs face
due to the conflict of laws, and Part V provides the interim and long-term solution
to this problem. Finally, Part VI concludes that, with the proper protections in
place, patients of Maine LCSWs can feel comfortable to continue treatment without
the fear of compelled disclosure.
II. PROTECTING THE PATIENT
“[C]onfidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment[;]”17
the effectiveness of the psychotherapy experience depends on the level of trust that
is built between a patient and her counselor.18 Based on this founding concept,
confidentiality is seen as a necessary component for a patient to “receive the best
medical care.”19 In order to facilitate the goal of a confidential exchange of
information, there are layers of protections for the patient’s disclosed statements
and information.20
This Part will briefly look at the role and duty of confidentiality as well as the
legal privilege that protects psychotherapy patients; the former prevents a mental
health expert from volunteering the information obtained from the therapeutic
sessions, and the latter prevents a therapist from being compelled to testify against
his or her patient in a testimonial hearing. Each is a result of the recognition that
individuals will be more open and honest in a therapeutic session if they are not
concerned that their innermost thoughts might be made public.21
A. The Role of Confidentiality in Psychotherapy
Privacy in the medical field is founded on the principle that doctors should

17. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183,
242 (1972)).
18. Disclosures of information: Thought on a process, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
(April 2007), http://www.apa.org/monitor/apr07/ethics.aspx.
19. Hindi T. Mermelstein & Joel J. Wallack, Confidentiality in the Age of HIPAA: A Challenge for
Psychosomatic Medicine, PUBMED.GOV (Apr. 2008) 97 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18354061.
20. Adult Mental Health: Rights and Legal Issues, MAINE.GOV, http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/
samhs/mentalhealth/rights-legal/confidentiality-statement.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
21. See Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of
the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 898 (1982).

2014]

COMPELLED TO TESTIFY

135

have the most accurate information to render a proper diagnosis.22 Ensuring
privacy in the medical field serves significant private and public interests by
limiting individual suffering and reducing overall ailments in the society. The need
for confidentiality is particularly acute with respect to mental health treatment,
where the patient is verbally disclosing intimate details of their life, where, if
revealed to the public may result in negative stigmas,23 discrimination in
employment,24 and overall embarrassment and hesitation to continue seeking help.
Psychotherapy is a type of treatment where a patient speaks with a mental
health provider, such as a LCSW, to identify the internal challenges that may be
impacting their everyday life.25 Sigmund Freud, the “father of psychoanalysis”
believed that certain mental or emotional issues manifest because the patient is
subconsciously trying to address repressed internal conflicts – if a patient keeps
these thoughts in the unconscious, it would result in mental illness; however, if the
patient discusses the memories, thoughts or urges, the symptoms would decrease. 26
Freud’s work focused on the relationship between the analyst and patient,
where the analyst is limited to only the role of “listening and talking to the patient”
in order to free the patient’s ego.27 However, in order to create this
psychotherapeutic relationship and provide effective treatment, Freud believed that
confidentiality was necessary.28 Observation changes behavior; a patient will be
less likely to reveal their innermost thoughts and conflicts if they believe that an
untrusted person is watching or listening, or that the information could be used
against them at a later time.29 It became understood that patients would resist
disclosing these repressed thoughts and feelings unless he or she has control over
the information they reveal.30
Confidentiality helps build a strong therapeutic relationship because a patient
will feel less inhibited to disclose their secret thoughts, and can establish a bond

22. JONATHAN I. EZOR, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN BUSINESS: LAWS & PRACTICES 101
(2012).
23. Mayo Clinic Staff, Mental Health: Overcoming the Stigma of Mental Illness, MAYO CLINIC
(May 17, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/mental-illness/in-depth/mentalhealth/art-20046477.
24. EZOR, supra note 22, at 102.
25. MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1974).
26. See, e.g., Jim Haggerty, History of Psychotherapy, PSYCH CENTRAL, http://psychcentral.com/lib/historyof-psychotherapy/000115 (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (“While there were scattered references to the value of
‘talking’ in the treatment of emotional problems . . . Sigmund Freud developed psychoanalysis around the turn of
the century, and made profound contributions to the field with his descriptions of the unconscious . . . and his
model of the human mind.”).
27. JAN EHRENWALD, THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: FROM HEALING MAGIC TO ENCOUNTER
647 (1991).
28. See, e.g., id.
29. Elisia Klinka, Note, It’s Been A Privilege, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 863, 899-901, n.277 (citing a
1962 study completed by the Yale Law Journal where 71% of people surveyed indicated that they would
be less likely to fully reveal their thoughts to the counselor without a protection of confidentiality).
30. Deborah Paruch, Comment, From Trusted Confidant to Witness for the Prosecution: The Case
Against the Recognition of A Dangerous-Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 9
U. N.H. L. REV. 327, 392 (2011); see also Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied Waiver
and the Evisceration of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL L.
REV. 79, 90 (2008).
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with the psychotherapist based on that trust.31 A patient’s ability to “shield”
himself from “public view” leaves open the possibility for the exchange of personal
information.32
While Freud’s theories were just the beginning for the modern schools of
psychotherapy,33 the basic principles regarding the need for confidentiality have
remained.34 For example, the American Psychological Association notes that,
“[c]onfidentiality is a respected part of psychology’s code of ethics” and that
additional laws exist to protect the patient’s privacy.35 In addition, the importance
of confidentiality and privacy in psychotherapy is noted in case law: in Jaffee v.
Redmond, the United States Supreme Court noted that psychotherapy relies on the
patients’ willingness to speak freely, and it would be “difficult, if not impossible
for [a psychiatrist] to function without being able to assure . . . patients of
confidentiality.”36 Understanding that privacy is paramount to the success of health
treatment, federal, 37 state,38 and professional guidelines39 take certain measures to
protect medical information.40
For example, federal statutes such as the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) provide protections for the information held by
“covered entities” and give patients “an array of rights” concerning that
information.41 “Ensuring strong privacy protections is critical to maintaining
individuals’ trust in their health care providers and willingness to obtain needed
31. Ellen McGrath, Between Client and Therapist, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Aug. 20, 2012),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200308/between-client-and-therapist.
32. Gregg David Josephson, “Couching the Law of Privilege": Supreme Court Recognition of
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 533, 552 (1998).
33. Haggerty, supra note 26.
34. Id. (stating that for the next 50 years, psychotherapy relied on Freud’s scholarship and in the
1950s, new methods were developed alongside the expansion of American psychology; however the
need for confidentiality remained steadfast).
35. Protecting your privacy: Understanding confidentiality, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/confidentiality.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
36. Jaffee v. Redmond, 501 US 1 (2006) (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes to Proposed Rules,
56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972)).
37. See, e.g., Health Information Privacy, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (HHS published a final Privacy Rule in
December 2000, which was later modified in August 2002. This Rule set national standards for the
protection of individually identifiable health information by three types of covered entities: health plans,
health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who conduct the standard health care transactions
electronically. Compliance with the Privacy Rule was required as of April 14, 2003 (April 14, 2004, for
small health plans)); 45 C.F.R. § 164.105 (2013); 42 C.F.R. § 51 (2013).
38. See, e.g., 22 M.R.S.A. §1711-C (2004 & Supp. 2013); 34-B M.R.S.A. § 1207 (2010); 34-B
M.R.S.A. § 3608(1)(F) (2010).
39. Off. of Adult Mental Health, Chapter 7: Rules Governing the Disclosure of Information Pertaining to
Mentally
Disabled
Clients,
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
SERVS.,
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/rules/10/chaps10.htm#193 (last visited Sept. 13, 2014); Ethical Principles of
Psychologists and Code of Conduct, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx (last
visited Sept. 13, 2014) [hereinafter APA Duty of Confidentiality].
40. Understanding Health Information Privacy, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (While HIPAA is an
important part of medical privacy, this article will be focusing on protection for disclosed information in
the course of treatment.).
41. Id.
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health care services, and these protections are especially important where very
sensitive information is concerned, such as mental health information.”42 By
providing protection to these private conversations, patients can feel more
comfortable addressing the real roots of their problems without fear of social or
legal persecution.
B. The Duty of Confidentiality
Confidentiality is an ethical concept usually imposed upon psychotherapists
through a professional or legal duty. For example, the American Psychological
Association (APA) issues the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct that consists of five general principals and specific ethical standards,
including the “primary obligation” of maintaining confidentiality.43 This duty
prevents a psychotherapist from voluntarily disclosing the patient’s information.
In addition, according to the National Association of Social Workers, “[s]ocial
workers should protect the confidentiality of clients . . . to the extent permitted by
law.”44 The Clinical Social Work Association promotes a duty to “maintain the
privacy of both current and former clients, whether living or deceased, and to
maintain the confidentiality of material that has been transmitted to them in any of
their professional roles.”45
Despite the value that absolute confidentiality might have on the therapeutic
relationship, this duty must give way in certain circumstances. For example, the
APA’s Ethical Standards rule 4.01 states that the duty of confidentiality exists,
“recognizing that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be regulated by
law.”46 Similar conditions are in place for social workers: “[c]onfidentiality is a
basic principle of social work intervention. It ensures the client that what is shared
with the social worker will remain confidential, unless there is an ethical or legal

42. HIPPA Privacy Rule And Sharing Info. Related to Mental Health, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERV., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/mhguidance.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2014).
43. APA Duty of Confidentiality, supra note 39. Psychologists have a primary obligation and take
reasonable precautions to protect confidential information obtained through or stored in any medium,
recognizing that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be regulated by law or established by
institutional rules or professional or scientific relationship. 4.02 Discussing the Limits of
Confidentiality: (a) Psychologists discuss with persons (including, to the extent feasible, persons who
are legally incapable of giving informed consent and their legal representatives) and organizations with
whom they establish a scientific or professional relationship (1) the relevant limits of confidentiality and
(2) the foreseeable uses of the information generated through their psychological activities. (b) Unless it
is not feasible or is contraindicated, the discussion of confidentiality occurs at the outset of the
relationship and thereafter as new circumstances may warrant. (c) Psychologists who offer services,
products, or information via electronic transmission inform clients/patients of the risks to privacy and
limits of confidentiality.”).
44. Ethics, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, https://www.socialworkers.org/
nasw/ethics/default.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
45. Ethics Code, CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.clinicalsocialworkassociation.org/
about-us/ethics-code (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
46. APA Duty of Confidentiality, supra note 39.
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exception.”47
While these exceptions vary depending on the jurisdiction, psychotherapists
generally need to disclose information when mandated by law, or to protect the
patient, psychotherapist, or third party from harm, including cases of child abuse.48
According to the Mayo Clinic, general situations where a psychotherapist may
disclose otherwise confidential information include threatening to “harm yourself
or commit suicide,” threatening to “harm or take the life of another person . . .
abusing a child or a vulnerable adult,” or “being unable to safely care for
yourself.”49 As discussed below, the notable circumstances that may require a
psychotherapist to disclose the confidential information center on protecting the
patient or the public.
According to the APA, unless the situation falls within “client consent, legal
mandate [or] legal permission” the psychotherapist may not disclose the protected
information.50 In the event that a psychotherapist discloses a patient’s confidential
information in an unauthorized way, the psychotherapist faces legal and
professional consequences.51 As such, psychotherapy patients can generally rely
on their therapist to maintain a duty of confidentiality—to keep secret the
confessed details of their lives—so long there is no intervening legal or ethical duty
to disclose.
C. The Legal Privilege
Unlike the ethical duty of confidentiality, privileges prevent certain individuals
from being compelled to disclose protected information in legal context.
Therefore, even if a psychotherapist discloses information under an exception to
the ethical duty, the information is still protected from disclosure in a testamentary
hearing. Usually, privileges are covered by the rules of evidence governing that
jurisdiction, and make this information inadmissible.52 However, states can impose
governing statutes that regulate the admissibility of otherwise privileged
information.53
The rules of evidence are generally designed to increase the “reliability of the

47. NASW Standards for Clinical Social Work in Social Work Practice, National Association of
Social
Workers
15
(2005),
http://www.socialworkers.org/practice/standards/
naswclinicalswstandards.pdf.
48. Stephen Behnke, Disclosing confidential information, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION, http://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/04/disclosing-information.aspx (last visited Nov. 20
2014).
49. Mayo Clinic Staff, Psychotherapy, MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.org/
tests-procedures/psychotherapy/basics/what-you-can-expect/prc-20013335.
50. Disclosing
confidential
information,
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION,
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/04/disclosing-information.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
51. Daniel Goleman, What You Reveal To A Psychotherapist May Go Further, N.Y. TIMES , April
14, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/14/health/what-you-reveal-to-a-psychotherapist-may-gofurther.html ("Any licensed therapist who breaches confidentiality without a patient's approval is open
to a lawsuit and can lose his license for violating professional ethics.").
52. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 501- 502; M.R. Evid. 502–514.
53. See, e.g., 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005.
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fact-finding process” by allowing probative evidence to come into the record.54
However, another role of the rules of evidence is to exclude unreliable or highly
prejudicial evidence from the courtroom.55 Privileges are a unique aspect of the
law because the fact-finder is specifically blocked from relevant and perhaps even
reliable information: “[e]videntiary privileges are the primary example of rules that
exclude evidence for the purpose of promoting extrinsic substantive policies that
exist outside of litigation.”56 As a result, privileges are at variance with the
ordinary evidentiary objectives, such as what Chief Justice Vinson called the
public’s right to “every man’s evidence.”57
The logic behind attaching a privilege to certain communications is that
protecting the underlying relationships serves a greater purpose for society than
does the need for the evidence.58 Privileges have been acknowledged to protect
communications between an attorney and his or her client, between spouses, and
between the physician and his or her patient in an effort to encourage the open
exchange of information.59
On the whole, there are four fundamental conditions necessary for a
communication to be covered by the evidentiary privilege:
1) The information must have been conveyed in “confidence that [it] will not be
60
disclosed;”
61
2) Confidentiality must be necessary to maintain the relationship;
3) The relationship supported by the privilege must be one that greater society
62
recognizes as appropriate and necessary; and
4) The disclosure would cause more harm to the relationship than the benefit
63
accomplished from the confidentiality.

While legal privileges protect a variety of relationships, the privilege
protecting psychotherapists, like the attorney-client privilege, is born out of a
professionally built relationship. In Upjohn Co. v. U.S., the Court held that the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege “[i]s to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”64 It is

54. Paruch, supra note 30 at 331. See also Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied
Waiver and the Evisceration of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL
L. REV. 79, 90 (2008) (“While other evidentiary rules aim to improve the reliability of evidence, leading
to enhanced truth-seeking by fact finders and more efficient trials, privileges provide benefits outside
adjudication, such as the preservation or protection of certain interpersonal relationships. Such purposes
are central to many evidentiary privileges recognized today, including those shielding communications
arising in marital, attorney-client, and clergy-believer relationships.”).
55. See Anthony Parsio, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Perils of Recognizing A
"Dangerous Patient" Exception in Criminal Trials, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 623 (2007).
56. Id. at 623.
57. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
58. See Parsio, supra note 55 at 624.
59. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 285 (3d ed. 2012).
60. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 527 (1961).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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essential to the professional relationship that the lawyer be “fully informed by the
client” in order to render the proper advice.65
On a similar theory, the psychotherapist-patient privilege looks to protect the
professional relationship between a mental health expert and her patient by
encouraging full disclosure of information.66 If a patient is fearful that the therapist
may disclose these secrets to anyone outside the trusted space of therapy, the
patient could be inhibited from revealing those innermost thoughts. The privilege
is in place to protect that information and to encourage those who need the support
of therapy to seek it without fear that their personal life will be made public; to
further the right to privacy—what Warren and Brandeis termed the right to be “[l]et
alone.”67
The value of the therapeutic relationship has been affirmed time and time
again in the psychotherapy profession, as well as federal and state courts. For
example, the Court in Jaffee, when recognizing a federal privilege, focused
primarily on the value of the therapeutic relationship,68 and the benefit to society in
protecting that relationship.69
Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust. . . . Effective
psychotherapy, by contrast, depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust
in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts,
emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for
which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential
communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or
disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede
70
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.

Privileges improve the medical relationship because the patient can “[f]eel free to
make a full disclosure of information to the physician in order that the physician
may most effectively provide needed services.”71 Understanding that the
conversations between a mental health expert and her patient are essential for
treatment, both state and federal courts currently apply the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.
D. Development of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
The first reported decision of a court recognizing a psychotherapist-patient
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
67. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890).
68. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 6 (“Reason tells us that psychotherapists and patients share a unique
relationship, in which the ability to communicate freely without the fear of public disclosure is the key
to successful treatment.” (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (7th Cir. 1995))).
69. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11 (“The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a
public good of transcendant importance.”).
70. Id. at 10 (internal citations omitted)
71. Ralph Ruebner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to Hipaa: A Foundation for A Federal
Physician-Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505, 572 (2004) (quoting Codes of Professional
Responsibility: Ethics Standards in Business, Health, and Law (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 4th ed. 1999)).
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privilege was in 1952 in the Illinois Cook County Court.72 In that case, the plaintiff
petitioned to have the defendant’s medical records produced and to have the
The hospital witnesses claimed that the
treating doctor testify.73
“[c]ommunications between the patient and the physician are privileged,” and that
this protection included psychiatric treatment.74
The court held that the information resulting from psychiatric treatment was
protected: “I am persuaded that the courts will guard the secrets which come to the
psychiatrist and will not permit him to disclose them . . . the privilege ought to be
granted and protected.”75
The Illinois Cook County Court held that the privilege protecting
psychotherapy patients is different from the established physician-patient or
attorney-client privileges because psychotherapy is “based on confidence” and if
courts compelled the disclosure it would be an “abuse of that confidence.”76
Because the psychotherapy relationship is “unique and not at all similar to the
relationship between a physician and patient” it requires a different privilege.77
An “ordinary physician” looks for his or her patient to reveal the physical
78
symptoms in order to try to identify the “particular malady” that ails the person.
In contrast, the psychotherapist is trying to identify the cause of the patient’s
79
mental and emotional distress. In doing so, a psychotherapists investigates the
patient’s experiences during childhood and adolescence; “[i]n fact, what he seeks
to do is to bring back to the conscious memory of the patient things forgotten but
80
which lied dormant in the subconscious mind.” The particularity of this
treatment requires the psychotherapist to “get that information out of the mouth of
81
his patient.”

The court’s analysis reflects the rationale supporting the ethical duty of
confidentiality—the nature and importance of the mental health treatment requires
serious professional and legal protections. Because psychological treatment
requires both a more in-depth analysis into the patient’s thoughts and more
complete disclosure of these facts, the necessity for a separate privilege to protect
the communications made in the course of treatment was necessary to the Illinois
court.82
In 1960, the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) stated in a report
that, “[a]mong physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain
confidentiality. His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon

72. Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 24, 1952), available at http://jaffeeredmond.org/cases/binder.htm.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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their willingness and ability to talk freely.”83 Specifically, GAP was concerned
that, without a psychotherapist-patient privilege, therapy would not be successful,84
much like the concern that representation would not be effective without the
attorney-client privilege.85 The GAP report suggested that the psychotherapistpatient privilege mirror the attorney-client privilege in both intent and exceptions.86
In 1961, the Connecticut legislature enacted a statute inspired by the GAP
model for a psychotherapist privilege.87 However, the Connecticut statute was
more detailed and “did not tie the scope of the privilege to the attorney-client
privilege.”88 Soon after, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky and Maryland followed with
statutes modeled after the Connecticut statute.89
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court proposed the first Federal Rules of
Evidence to Congress.90 Initially, the proposal included nine federal privileges,
including the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 91 In 1973, the proposed rules came
before Congress for approval.92 Due to political “crossfire,” Congress eliminated
the proposed privileges for a single rule: Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 501.93
83. Paul W. Mosher, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The History and Significance of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Decision in the Case of Jaffee v. Redmond (1999) (unpublished manuscript) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Confidentiality and Privileged
Communication in the Practice of Psychiatry, 92 (1960)), available at http://jaffeeredmond.org/articles/mosher.htm).
84. Id. (“Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of their patients' conscious, but their
unconscious feelings and attitudes as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a
patient's awareness and, in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to
secrecy blocks successful treatment.”); Smith, supra note 54, at 95 (“The psychiatrists argued, absent a
guarantee that the words exchanged with their patients could not become evidence in a courtroom,
patients could not fully enjoy the potential benefits of their treatment.”).
85. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 385 (1981).
86. Abraham S. Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the
Connecticut
Statute,
118
AM.
J.
PSYCHOL.
733,
736
(1962),
available
at
http://journals.psychiatryonline.org/article.aspx?articleid=148487 ("The confidential relationship and
communication between the psychiatrist and patient shall be placed on the same basis as regards
privilege, as provided by law between attorney and client."); Smith, supra note 54, at 95 (“Where
exceptions or waivers applied to the attorney-client privilege, the same approach would be taken with
the psychiatrist-patient privilege.”).
87. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 86, at 733.
88. Smith, supra note 54, at 95; Goldstein & Katz, supra note 86, at 736 ("The GAP statute
suggested a host of problems which call into question the appropriateness of the attorney-client
model.").
89. Smith, supra note 54 at 96.
90. Deborah Paruch, supra note 30 at 340.
91. Id.; MODEL CODE EVID. R. 220-23; see MANFRED S. GUTTMACHER & HENRY WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 269 (1st ed.1952).
92. Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal Rule of Evidence
501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV.
511, 512 (1994).
93. FED. R. EVID. 501 (“Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.”).
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Instead of listing the federal privileges, Rule 501 directs the reader to the federal
common law.94 Therefore, while the psychotherapist-patient privilege was
originally proposed in the 1973 Rules of Evidence, it was not until 1996 that the
United States Supreme Court held that there is a federal privilege for
psychotherapists.95 By that year, all fifty states had adopted a psychotherapistpatient privilege through statute or rule.96
In 1996, in Jaffee v. Redmond97, the United States Supreme Court finally held
that statements made to a licensed social worker in the course of psychotherapy
treatment were protected from compelled disclosure.98 This case is a result of a
plaintiff trying to see the defendant’s psychotherapist’s records in a wrongful death
action.99
In this case, a police officer, Mary Lu Redmond, responded to a report of a
fight at an apartment complex.100 Believing that Ricky Allen was about to stab
another man, Redmond shot and killed him.101 The administrator of Allen’s estate,
Jaffee, brought a claim in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois alleging that Redmond violated Allen’s constitutional rights by using
excessive force.102
During the discovery process, Jaffee learned that Redmond had been meeting
with a clinical social worker, Karen Beyer.103 Jaffee requested Beyer’s notes.104
Redmond opposed the request, claiming a psychotherapist-patient privilege
protected the notes from disclosure.105 The Court concluded “confidential
communications between a psychotherapist and her patient ‘promotes sufficiently
important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.’”106 Despite the
fact that the psychotherapist’s notes and testimony may be relevant and useful for
the plaintiff’s case, the Court held that the interest in keeping the information
private was more important than the interests served by disclosure. The Court held
that the privilege serves important public ends and thus the psychotherapist-patient
privilege covers the confidential information communicated to licensed
psychologists and psychiatrists as well as communications to licensed social
workers when there is intent for the conversation to be confidential and the
communications occurred in the course of psychotherapy.107
The Court created a “wall of protection against disclosures” of such
94. Id.
95. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 2 (1996) (“[I]t is appropriate for the federal courts to recognize
a psychotherapist privilege is confirmed by the fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have
enacted into law some form of the privilege.”).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Jerome S. Beigler, Tarasoff v. Confidentiality, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 273, 283 (1984) (quoting
Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40 (1980)).
107. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
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information at the discovery stage and through litigation.108 In addition, the Court
stated that Fed. R. Evid. 501 gives the courts the ability to “define new privileges”
through common law, concluding that the private and public interests support the
psychotherapist-patient privilege;109 the privilege serves private interest by
promoting effective therapy through trust and confidence in your therapist,110 and
the privilege serves public interests by opening a path for successful treatment,
which promotes people to seek mental and emotional health.111
Following the Court’s holding in Jaffee, every jurisdiction had a statutory,
evidentiary or common-law privilege protecting communications made during
psychotherapy treatment112 where a patient had the right to prevent the disclosure
of confidential communication resulting from mental health treatment.113 While
Jaffee is not binding to the states, the policy reasons behind Jaffee can be seen in
the discussion of state privileges.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege protects arguably the most private
information a person can convey: their innermost struggles. Built upon a
relationship of trust, a psychotherapist can help an individual identify and confront
these issues.
E. The Maine Privilege
As covered previously, LCSWs are considered psychotherapists under the
current law of privileges due to the analogous role that LCSWs have in mental
health treatment.114 However, Maine law has not always given equal protections to
psychotherapists and social workers. The Maine Rules of Evidence have been
protecting psychotherapy patients for decades, however the definition of a
“psychotherapist” has evolved with the years. For example, in 1976, the Maine
Rules of Evidence defined a psychotherapist as:
A person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably
believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a
mental or emotional condition . . . [or] a person licensed or certified as a
115
psychologist or psychological examiner.

The commentary notes that the rule “combines a general physician-patient privilege
with the statutory privileges for psychiatrists, psychologists and psychological
examiners.” However, the rule did not incorporate all statutory privileges for
mental health experts, and in 1977, the Maine Legislature further enacted a statute
providing a conditional privilege for social workers.116 The statute is considered
conditional because if it is necessary for the “proper administration of justice” to
108. Smith, supra note 54 at 79.
109. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 2.
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 12.
113. See B.W. Best, Annotation, Privilege, in Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, Arising from
Relationship between Psychiatrist or Psychologist and Patient, 44 A.L.R.3d. 24 (1972).
114. M.R. Evid. 503.
115. Richard Field & Peter Murray, Maine Evidence (1976).
116. 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 (1999 & Supp. 2013).
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disregard the privilege, the privilege will not be acknowledged, and disclosure may
be compelled.117 This statute was most recently amended in 2001, and it currently
states:
Except at the request of, or with the consent of, the client, no person licensed
under this chapter may be required to testify in any civil or criminal action, suit or
proceeding at law or in equity respecting any information which he may have
acquired in providing social work services to the client in a professional and
contractual capacity if that information was necessary to enable him to furnish
professional social work services to the client. However, when the physical or
mental condition of the client is an issue in that action, suit or proceeding or when
a court in the exercise of sound discretion deems the disclosure necessary to the
proper administration of justice, no information communicated to, or otherwise
learned by, that licensed person in connection with the provision of social work
118
services may be privileged and disclosure may be required.

When this statute was enacted, it provided protection to a class of
psychotherapy that would not otherwise be shielded from disclosure. This
privilege came into being through the licensing provisions for the profession.119
The legislative history indicates that there was concern at the time of enactment
that this privilege was only “illusionary” because “[i]t seems to promise privileged
communication to the person who is talking to a licensed social worker and yet the
court can strip this away very easily, so it sort of exists but yet it doesn't exist.”120
Nevertheless, the bill passed, and 32 M.R.SA. § 7005 has been providing a
qualified protection for patients of social work to this day.121
In 2008, the Maine Rules of Evidence expanded the privilege to include
licensed clinical social workers, thus providing more protection than 32 M.R.S.A.
§ 7005.122 Citing Jaffee v. Redmond, the Maine advisory committee noted: “[o]f
the various kinds of social workers covered by state licensing requirements, those
designated and licensed as ‘clinical social workers’ seem best to fit the traditional
role of psychotherapist as contemplated by the privilege.”123 By including licensed
clinical social workers under the privilege in the Maine Rules of Evidence, the Law
Court seemed to indicate that the previously used “conditional” statutory privilege
should be pushed aside for the more protective evidentiary privilege. However, the

117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Legis. Rec. 442 (2d Reg. Sess. 1978).
121. 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 (1999 & Supp. 2013).
122. M.R. Evid. 413 advisory committee’s notes to 2008 amend., Me. Judicial Branch website/Rules
(visited Oct. 4, 2014) (The privilege would also encompass licensed clinical social workers when
treating emotional and mental conditions and four defined classes of licensed counseling professionals,
“licensed professional counselors,” “licensed clinical professional counselors,” “licensed marriage and
family therapists,” and “licensed pastoral counselors,” when performing their counseling functions.).
123. Id. (The committee noted that the “licensed counseling professionals proposed to be covered by
the privilege are now licensed under 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 13851 et seq. These licensed counselors provide
different forms of psychotherapy in at least some circumstances. Such professionals are currently
covered by a conditional privilege which permits disclosure of client communications ‘when a court in
the exercise of sound discretion determines the disclosure necessary to the proper administration of
justice.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting 32 M.R.S.A. § 13862).
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conditional statute and its broad exceptions still remain.124
Currently, the “Health Care Professional, Mental Health Professional, and
Licensed Counseling Professional—Patient Privilege” (hereafter “psychotherapistpatient privilege)125 included in the Rules of Evidence states that “[a] patient has a
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing
confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the
patient’s physical, mental or emotional condition . . . .”126 The patient, the patient’s
guardian, or the “personal representative of a deceased patient” may assert the
privilege.127
F. General Exceptions to the Privilege
While the psychotherapist-patient privilege serves important interests, there are
still situations when the privilege must yield, and these exceptions vary by
jurisdiction. In its recognition of the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege, the
Jaffee Court did not provide any guidance as to the exceptions for the federal
privilege.128 However, years earlier in the 1969 proposed federal rules of evidence
to Congress, the psychotherapist-patient privilege included three exceptions: 1) No
privilege for communication in order to hospitalize the patient; 2) No privilege for
court-ordered examinations; and 3) No privilege for proceedings where the
patient’s mental condition is instrumental to the case.129 Similar exceptions are
found in the state-applied privileges as well.
For example, the Maine Rules of Evidence, like the proposed Federal Rules,
provide three distinct exceptions to the privilege.130 First, 503(e)(1) states that
there is no privilege for communications “[r]elevant to an issue in proceedings to
hospitalize the patient for mental illness . . . . ” if the mental health professional
determines that the “[p]atient is in need of hospitalization.”131 Next, 503(e)(2)
states that there is no privilege for communications related to examinations by
order of the court.132 This is when the court orders the patient to be examined for
physical, mental or an emotional condition. Finally, in 503(e)(3), there is no
privileged communication when the patient’s mental, physical, or emotional
condition is an element of the patient’s claim or defense.133 Given that the Rules of
Evidence specifically lay out the privilege and the exceptions in the same rule, it
suggests that an individual need not look further in the law to know the power and
limitations of the privilege.134

124. 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 (1999 & Supp. 2013).
125. M.R. Evid. 503 (This provision amounts to a psychotherapist-patient privilege.).
126. M.R. Evid. 503(b).
127. M.R. Evid. 503(d).
128. Anne Bowen Poulin, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond: Where Do
We Go from Here?, 76 WASH. U. L. REV. 1341, 1373 (1998).
129. Paruch, supra note 30 at 341.
130. See Goldstein & Katz, supra note 86 and accompanying text.
131. M.R. Evid. 503(e)(1).
132. M.R. Evid. 503(e)(2).
133. M.R. Evid. 503(e)(3).
134. M.R. Evid. 503.
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III. PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
While the protections for psychotherapy patients may appear extensive, they
are balanced with both professional and legal exceptions. Along with traditional
public policy exceptions discussed above,135 the duty of confidentiality and the
psychotherapist-patient privilege must give way when the patient expresses the
intent to harm another individual.
The duties and privileges protecting the patient exist because the Supreme
Court has recognized that the psychotherapeutic relationship has more value on the
whole when compared to the potentially probative evidence.136 However, this
value quickly dissipates when the patient is using the therapy session to process or
plan for a dangerous event. This Part will look at the development of the legal
duties in place to protect the public from potentially dangerous individuals as well
as the issues that these exceptions have on the effectiveness of the psychotherapy
treatment.
A. Ethical Duty of Confidentiality: The Duty to Report
A notable exception to the duty of confidentiality is for dangerous patients.
“Although confidentiality is one of the major underpinnings of psychotherapy, the
trend of cases clearly suggests that courts regard the safety of the public as superior
to confidentiality in therapy when the two issues are in conflict.”137 This issue was
specifically addressed in the landmark case of Tarasoff v. Regents of California.138
1. Tarasoff v. Regents of California
In 1976, the California Supreme Court held that a psychotherapist must
disclose otherwise confidential information when the psychotherapists determine
that his patient poses a serious threat of danger to a third party to protect potential
victims.139 The Tarasoff case began in August of 1969 when Prosenjit Poddar, a
psychotherapy patient of Dr. Lawrence Moore, told his therapist that he intended to
kill Tatiana Tarasoff.140 Dr. Moore informed campus police who briefly detained
Poddar, but neither Dr. Moore nor the campus police took any additional action.141
Two months later, in October of 1969, Poddar killed Tarasoff.142
Tarasoff’s parents sued the Regents of California, Dr. Moore’s employer,
claiming that Poddar had expressed his intention to kill their daughter to Dr.
Moore, and therefore the Regents of California were responsible for their

135. See e.g. M.R. Evid. 503(e)(1-3).
136. Anthony Parsio, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Perils of Recognizing A
"Dangerous Patient" Exception in Criminal Trials, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 623, (2007).
137. Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, “Where the Public Peril Begins”: 25 Years After
TARASOFF, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 215 (2000), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
torts01/syllabus/readings/buckner.html.
138. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
139. Id. at 346.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 341.
142. Id. at 339.
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daughter’s death through the respondeat superior doctrine.143 In response to
Tarasoff’s claim, the Regents of California maintained that they owed no duty to
the victim.144
In the Court’s holding, the California Supreme Court created what has come to
be known as the “Tarasoff duty”—a duty imposed on psychotherapists to protect
third parties from reasonably foreseeable harm caused by their patients.145 In this
holding, the court recognized that, in some situations, only psychotherapists could
avert imminent harm through their disclosure.146 The Court recognized that
psychotherapists would need to walk a fine line when assessing whether or not
their patient might act in a dangerous or violent manner.147 While the court does
not “require that the therapist, in making that determination, render a perfect
performance,” the psychotherapist should implement a “reasonable degree of skill,
knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of that
professional specialty under similar circumstances.’”148 The duty is only triggered
when the mental health expert believes that the patient will act on his or her
statement or threat.
In response to this holding, and in order to protect the therapeutic relationship,
psychologists are expected to discuss the “relevant limits of confidentiality” with
their patients.149 This is important so that patients understand that, while their
information is generally confidential, this is not a guarantee, and hopefully the
psychotherapist and the patient can work through the disclosure and preserve the
therapeutic relationship.
In Maine, mental health experts are held to a similar provision to disclose
otherwise confidential information when their patients pose a threat of harm: “A
licensed mental health professional shall disclose protected health information that
the professional believes is necessary to avert a serious and imminent threat to
health or safety when the disclosure is made in good faith to any person . . . who is
reasonably able to prevent or minimize the threat.”150
The majority of states are now following the Tarasoff decision, either through

143. Id.
144. Id. at 340.
145. Id. at 342.
146. Id. at 345.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. APA Duty of Confidentiality, supra note 39.
150. 34-B M.R.S.A. § 1207(6-A) (2010 & Supp. 2013); see also 22 M.R.S.A. §1711-C (6)(D) (2004
& Supp. 2013) (“Disclosure may be made without authorization as follows: To appropriate persons
when a health care practitioner or facility that is providing or has provided diagnosis, treatment or care
to the individual in good faith believes that disclosure is made to avert a serious threat to health or
safety.”); 34-B M.R.S.A. § 1207(1)(I) (2013) (“A state-designated statewide health information
exchange may disclose a client's health care information covered under this section even if the client has
not chosen to opt in to allow the state-designated statewide health information exchange to disclose the
individual's health care information when, in a health care provider's judgment, disclosure is necessary
to: (1) Avert a serious threat to the health or safety of others, if the conditions, as applicable, described
in 45 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 164.512(j)(2010) are met; or (2) Prevent or respond to
imminent and serious harm to the client and disclosure is to a provider for diagnosis or treatment.”).
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statute or common law.151 However, Tarasoff does not address the evidentiary
issues that lay tangent to the Tarasoff duty to disclose, namely its relationship with
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.152
B. The Evidentiary Privilege: The Dangerous Patient Exception
Similar to the duty of confidentiality, there are certain situations where a court
may compel the unauthorized disclosure of a patient’s information because the
threat of harm is more serious than the need to protect the information. It is
necessary to note, however, that disclosing information under an exception to the
privilege is distinct from the Tarasoff disclosures.
Under Tarasoff, a psychotherapist is under a duty to protect potential victims
by excusing the ethical duty of confidentiality to deliver this warning. However,
the dangerous-patient exception requires the psychotherapist to push aside the
evidentiary psychotherapist-patient privilege and testify as to confidential details in
order to protect a third party. As the Ninth circuit noted, the Tarasoff duty to report
and the testimonial privilege are distinct concepts, and the duty to report does not
necessarily trigger a “an abrogation of the federal testimonial privilege.”153
While analogous, the harm from a dangerous-patient exception may surpass
the harm from a Tarasoff disclosure because the patient’s rights and liberties can be
significantly impeded as a result of the psychotherapist’s testimony. The fear that
the psychotherapist might disclose confidential information may prevent a patient
from being completely honest. However, this apprehension might intensify if there
is a threat of prosecution in a courtroom, where the patient’s most private and
embarrassing thoughts might be forever codified in a court record.
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the advisory
committee for the 1969 proposed rules specifically noted that the rules did not
include an exception for when a patient threatens harm against another:
Its members were persuaded that, as a class, patients willing to express to
psychiatrists their intention to commit crime are not ordinarily likely to carry out
that intention. Instead, they are making a plea for help. The very making of such
pleas affords the psychiatrist his unique opportunity to work with patients in an
attempt to resolve their problems. Such resolutions would be impeded if patients
were unable to speak freely for fear of possible disclosure at a later date in a legal
154
proceeding.

However, in the 1996 Jaffee decision, the United States Supreme Court alluded to
the possibility of a dangerous-patient exception.155 This exception permits the
psychotherapist to testify as to otherwise privileged information without the
patient’s consent if there is reason to believe the patient poses a threat of imminent
harm against a third party.156
151. George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege:
The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV. 33, 45-48 (1999).
152. See id.
153. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
154. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 86 at 738-39.
155. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996).
156. Id.
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Although it would be premature to speculate about most future developments in
the federal psychotherapist privilege, we do not doubt that there are situations in
which the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm to the
patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the
157
therapist.

Although the United States Supreme Court affirmed that psychotherapists couldn’t
be compelled to testify about a patient’s confidential disclosures, the Jaffee
footnote could be seen as suggesting a dangerous-patient exception when there is a
serious threat of harm to the patient or another person.158
The issue that the dangerous-patient exception seeks to address is that
sometimes there are people who pose a serious threat of imminent harm against
others, the only person who knows about this threat is the psychotherapist, and the
only way to avert that harm is through the therapist’s testimony.159 Currently there
is a federal circuit split as to whether a dangerous-patient exception should apply,
and only some states have chosen to incorporate a dangerous-patient exception into
that jurisdiction.160
The conflict about whether to incorporate a dangerous-patient exception hinges
on the patient’s privacy interest compared to the protection of potential victims.
For example, in United States v. Chase, the Court noted that “[i]f our Nation’s
mental health is indeed as valuable as the Supreme Court has indicated, and we
think it is, the chilling effect that would result from the recognition of a ‘dangerous
patient’ exception and its logical consequences is the first reason to reject it.”161
The value of the psychotherapist-patient relationship resonated with the Court and
led to the rejection of a dangerous-patient exception in the Ninth Circuit. However,
not all jurisdictions agree. With the Jaffee footnote as the foundation, several
federal jurisdictions have decided, one way or another, on whether to acknowledge
a dangerous-patient exception.
In United States v. Auster, the Fifth Circuit recognized the dangerous-patient
exception, but refused to apply it to the facts of this case because the defendant did
not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the threats he made.162
Therefore, if the dangerous-patient exception is to apply, it is necessary to ensure
that the privilege has been established.
In United States v. Glass, the Tenth Circuit held that a dangerous-patient
exception is appropriate if the threat is serious when the threat is made.163 In its
holding, the Court looked to Jaffee164 and established that the federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege does apply in this case.165 However, depending
on whether the threat conveyed during a psychotherapy session was “serious when
it was uttered and whether its disclosure was the only means of averting harm,” the
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
See Donaldson v. Donaldson, No. PA-13-287 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Aug. 19, 2013).
Harris, supra note 151.
Id. at 978 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 584-585 (6th Cir. 2000)).
United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312 (5th Circ. 2008).
United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)).
Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360.
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privilege may be excused under the dangerous-patient exception.166 The Tenth
Circuit remanded to inquire further into the seriousness of the threat and the
available options.167
The above referenced federal cases fell into line with the dangerous-patient
exception foreshadowed and outlined in Jaffee footnote 19.168 The dangerouspatient exception should only apply if the privilege has first been established,169 the
threat communicated was serious when said, and there is no other way to avert the
harm than by excusing the privilege.170
While federal courts sparked the nation-wide conversation, several states have
independently addressed the issue. For example, California incorporated a
dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in their Rules
of Evidence: “There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has
reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition
as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that
disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger.”171
California is a state that has enacted legislation that provides that therapists may
testify against their patients if they believe the patient would be dangerous to
himself or another.172 The Law Revision Commission commented that:
Although the dangerous-patient exception might inhibit the relationship between
the patient and his psychotherapist to a limited extent, it is essential that
appropriate action be taken if the psychotherapist becomes convinced during the
course of treatment that the patient is a menace to himself or others and the patient
refuses to permit the psychotherapist to make the disclosure necessary to prevent
173
the threatened danger.

Other than California, few states have statutes that clearly indicate whether or
not a dangerous-patient exception exists.174 For example, Illinois permits the
psychotherapist-patient privilege to be abrogated in situations like “trials for
homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate
circumstances of the homicide.”175 Wyoming law will excuse the privilege in
situations where “an immediate threat of physical violence against a readily
identifiable victim is disclosed to the psychologist.”176 Likewise, Ohio law permits
a court to compel the “testimony” of a psychotherapist if there is a “clear and

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996).
169. Auster, 517 F.3d at 315.
170. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360.
171. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1967).
172. Id. (“There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to
believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the
person or property of another and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the
threatened danger.”).
173. 7 Cal.L.Rev.Comm. Reports 1 (1965).
174. Harris, supra note 151.
175. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 15.5 (West, 2014).
176. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-27-123 (West, 2014).
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present danger to the client or other persons.”177
When considering the dangerous-patient exception, some commentators argue
that an exception is appropriate because, due to the other enumerated exceptions,178
the impact on the privilege would be minimal.179 This argument is countered by
the contention that another exception, especially an unpredictable exception, could
lead to the evisceration of the privilege and destroy the relationships that the
privilege aims to protect.180
Given the current events and past holdings considering a dangerous-patient
exception, it is fair to say that the psychotherapy-patient privilege might need to
give way in extreme circumstances to protect the health and safety of the greater
population. However, in order to keep the current benefits of psychotherapy while
adding the benefits of the dangerous-patient exception, the situation must be
specific, limited and extreme to properly co-exist with the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.
IV. THE MAINE ISSUE: 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 IS AN ANTIQUATED STATUTE THAT
UNDERMINES THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE INTENT OF
THE MAINE RULES OF EVIDENCE
Arguably, “dangerous” individuals who make threatening statements in
therapy are those who could benefit the most from continued mental health
treatment. The privilege serves a public and private interest by promoting this
mental health treatment, and an exception to the privilege, such as the dangerouspatient exception, could prove detrimental not only to the individual’s treatment,
but for the safety and wellbeing of the greater population.181 Therefore, proceeding
with a dangerous-patient exception, or any exception that uproots the protection of
the privilege, should be done with careful regard for the intent of the privilege in
the first place.
The issue facing Maine LCSW patients is that 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 goes
beyond the dangerous-patient exception to allow the court to set aside the privilege
in any circumstance the court finds necessary.182 While the Maine Rules of
Evidence incorporated LCSWs into the protection originally afforded to
psychologists and psychotherapists, this effort is fruitless as long as this statute
continues to conflict.183 If the privilege is going to be effective, patients “[m]ust be
177. The Ohio statute specifically identifies testimony as opposed to other privileged situations. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (West, 2014).
178. B. Joseph Wadsworth, Note, Evidence-Recognition of a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996), 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 873, 880-81 (1997).
179. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998).
180. Id. at 410 (The Court stated that “A ‘no harm in one more exception’ rational could contribute
to the general erosion of the privilege, without reference to common-law principles or ‘reason and
experience.’”). This was supported two years later in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996)
(discussing that “[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.” (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
181. Parsio, supra note 55 at 650-51.
182. 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005.
183. Id.; see also 32 M.R.S.A. § 13862 (1999) (“Privileged Communications: Except at the request
or consent of the client, no person licensed under this chapter may be required to testify in any civil or
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able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected.”184 This broad discretion afforded to the courts creates an uncertainty to
the psychotherapist-patient privilege for LCSWs because the application of the
protection would vary depending on the court’s understanding of when justice
requires the disclosure. This Maine statute leaves the fate of the psychotherapistpatient privilege to the unpredictable discretion of the court, and renders the 2008
amendment of the Rules of Evidence ineffective.185
For example, when a daughter sought a protection from abuse order from the
Maine District Court in Biddeford against her mother, the court held that the
LCSW would be compelled to testify against her patient as to the threats the mother
made against her daughter.186
On June 18, 2013, a police officer arrived at the daughter’s home to inform her
that her mother made threats against her life during a counseling session with a
LCSW.187 The police were notified of this threat when the LCSW, based on her
professional judgment, believed that the threat was credible, and that she had an
ethical duty to inform and warn the potential victim.188 Based on the LCSW’s tip,
the police notified the daughter of the threat, but did not take any additional action
against the mother.189
In fear for her life, the daughter turned to the Maine District Court in
Biddeford, and was granted a temporary protection order under the Protection from
Abuse statute, 19-A M.R.S.A. §4001, et seq. (PFA).190 The matter was set for
hearing on August 19, 2013.191 In the meantime, the daughter subpoenaed the
LCSW to testify at the hearing.192 The LCSW filed a motion to quash the subpoena
citing the psychotherapist-patient privilege.193 The daughter filed an opposition to
the motion to quash, and in addition she filed a motion to compel the counselor’s
testimony.194 And finally, the mother objected to the motion to compel.195
The court held a hearing on the pending motions.196 The issue was whether or

criminal action, suit or proceeding at law or in equity respecting any information that the person
licensed or registered may have acquired in providing counseling services or marriage and family
therapy services to the client in a professional and contractual capacity if that information was necessary
to enable the licensee to furnish professional counseling services to the client. When the physical or
mental condition of the client is an issue in that action, suit or proceeding or when a court in the
exercise of sound discretion determines the disclosure necessary to the proper administration of justice,
information communicated to or otherwise learned by that licensed or registered person in connection
with the provision of counseling or marriage and family therapy services may not be privileged and
disclosure may be required.”) (emphasis added).
184. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (discussing the attorney-client privilege).
185. 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005.
186. Donaldson v. Donaldson, No. PA-13-287 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Aug. 19, 2013).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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not the court could compel the LCSW to testify as to potentially privileged
information in a PFA hearing.197
The mother argued that, while it is true that the court can compel a mental
health expert to testify, the statements made would be inadmissible under the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.198 The daughter argued that the Maine Rules of
Evidence list of exceptions to the psychotherapist-privilege was not exhaustive, and
therefore the court could read in a dangerous-patient exception to compel the
therapist to testify.199
On the one hand is the daughter’s safety; the alleged homicidal threats are the
only evidence that the daughter has to get protection against her mother from the
court. However, on the other hand is the mother’s privacy and mental health; if the
LCSW is forced to testify against her, the mother may not ever receive the mental
health treatment she needs for fear that her most intimate thoughts will be revealed
in a courtroom setting.
As to the admissibility of the LCSW’s testimony, the court held that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was not “an absolute bar to testimony,” and that,
in this case, the court would hear from the psychotherapist.200 The court came to
this holding because the LCSW had already disclosed the alleged threat to the
police, and because the court had “express statutory authority to allow disclosure of
confidential communications made to the social work[er] when ‘necessary to the
proper administration of justice.’”201 The court found this protection hearing to be
an appropriate situation to compel a psychotherapist’s testimony.202
Without the therapist’s testimony, the court could not properly assess if the
daughter could obtain a PFA order to protect her against imminent harm because
the only way for the daughter to obtain an order was to prove that her mother made
a threat against her life, and the only admissible evidence of this fact was the
LCSWs testimony.203
The court held that although the exceptions to Maine’s psychotherapyprivilege do not apply in this case, the statutes permit the LCSW’s limited
disclosure.204 Therefore, the court looked to this statutory grant of authority, and
held that the information was not privileged and the LCSW could testify as to the
homicidal threats the mother made during treatment.205
In its holding, the court was mindful of the potential implications of this
ruling—if the LCSW’s testimony is not limited, the harm done to the mother’s
psychotherapy treatment would far exceed the benefit of the disclosure.206 In an
effort to serve both parties’ interests, the court limited the LCSW’s testimony and
disclosure.207 In the court’s order on the Motion to Quash, the court said:
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 32 M.R.S.A § 7005 (1964 & Supp. 2013)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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(1) [The LCSW] will be ordered to testify about the report she made to the
Biddeford Police Department, namely what statements she made to the police in
such report.
(2) The court may further order [the LCSW] to testify about facts that gave rise to
her decision to make that report, including statements made by Defendant, but
reserves final ruling on this to trial.
(3) Other statements made or information acquired in the course of the counseling
relationship between [the mother] and the LCSW beyond the scope of items 1 and
2, above, are determined to be privileged and outside the scope of permitted
testimony, unless Defendant opens the door through her examination of the
LCSW.
(4) The subpoena does not request production of any documents, and therefore the
LCSW will not be required to produce any such documents, records or notes. To
the extent the LCSW uses and documents or records to refresh her recollection,
208
disclosure may be required in accordance with Rule 612.

This ruling used the power granted to the court via statute, as well as the
underlying social policy of the privilege to strike a balance between privacy and
protection. In this situation, the only way for the potential victim to receive
protection, absent an agreement, was through the clinical social worker’s
disclosure. There was no other evidence available.
However, the court’s use of 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 in this context opens the door
not only for a dangerous-patient exception in Maine but for a total abrogation of the
psychotherapist privilege permitted under the Maine Rules of Evidence for
LCSWs, because the fate of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in regard to social
workers is left to the discretion of the hearing judge. The conditions set forth in the
statute run contrary to the goals of the current evidentiary privilege because it can
cause a serious disruption in the therapist-patient relationship. Under 32 M.R.S.A.
§ 7005, the psychotherapist can be compelled to testify against their patient, an
event that undoubtedly disrupts, if not forever severs, the psychotherapist-patient
relationship that the Maine Rules of Evidence sought to protect.
As Justice Rehnquist wrote in Upjohn Co. v. United States, an “uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”209 If Maine is to
maintain an effective psychotherapist-patient privilege for LCSWs, the statute must
be adjusted to limit its discretion under § 7005 to serious threats of harm when the
patient has actual knowledge of the limits of confidentiality, and when there is no
other reasonable means to avert the harm. In addition, the psychotherapist’s
testimony should be limited in scope to preserve as much of the relationship as
possible. For the future of the Maine social workers, and the mental health
treatment they provide, courts must limit their discretion under 32 M.R.S.A. §
7005.
V. THE SOLUTION
In order to properly protect LCSW patients, and to acknowledge the intent of

208. Parsio, supra note 55 at 650-51.
209. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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the 2008 amendment to the Maine Rules of Evidence, the conditional privilege in
32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 needs to change. Therefore the Maine Legislature should look
to amend § 7005 to reflect the 2008 incorporation of LCSWs into the Maine Rules
of Evidence psychotherapist-patient privilege and associated protections and
exceptions.
However, as long as 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 remains in its current form, Maine
courts should use their discretion to protect and preserve the Maine
psychotherapist-patient privilege. The following recommendation provides a
format to protect the integrity of the privilege, while still allowing a limited
exception in the event of an imminent threat of bodily harm until the legislature can
address the discrepancy.210 Given that Maine does not have an enumerated
dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, this
recommendation reflects upon the discussion and policy arguments concerning the
benefits and downfalls of dangerous-patient exceptions from other jurisdictions.
A. The Patient has Actual Knowledge of the Rights and Exceptions
Under the Privilege
One of the fundamental aspects to creating a strong therapeutic relationship is
the concept of trust; without trust, a patient is less likely to disclose the inner
conflicts to receive the proper psychoanalysis and treatment.211 While the limits of
confidentiality are often enumerated in publically available records,
“confidentiality is a protection [that is] often assumed by patients to be total, but
known by therapists to be severely limited.”212 Because of this assumption, it is
important for therapists to inform their patients that the protections are not absolute
because “disclosing information about a patient without knowledge or consent
would be a breach of trust.”213
Currently, neither Maine LCSWs nor patients can predict whether or not the
information discussed will be protected by the privilege due to the statutory
exception in § 7005. Because the protections and exceptions are unknown to both
parties, it is difficult to establish a trusting therapeutic relationship, and whatever
relationship is built can be easily shattered by the therapist’s compelled disclosure
at a future testimonial hearing.
By understanding the protections and limits of the privilege, a patient (and the
210. While the Maine Rules of Evidence do not have a dangerous-patient exception, this
recommendation is in the event that the court is inclined to use 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 in a dangerouspatient situation. Ideally, Maine laws and rules will coexist at some point in a manner that acknowledges
LCSWs as a prominent mental health service, and yet still offer protection to potential victims.
211. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 459 (1976) (“Until a patient can trust
his psychiatrist not to violate their confidential relationship, ‘the unconscious psychological control
mechanism of repression will prevent the recall of past experiences.’”); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,
2 (1996) (“Effective psychotherapy depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust, and therefore
the mere possibility of disclosure of confidential communications may impede development of the
relationship necessary for successful treatment.”); Scull v. Super. Ct., 206 Cal. App. 3d 784, 789 (Ct.
App. 1988) (“The accurate diagnosis and effective treatment in psychotherapy are greatly dependent
upon conditions of trust and confidentiality between patient and therapist.”).
212. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND CONFIDENTIALITY: TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION, BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY, AND REPORTING DUTIES 291 (1998).
213. Id. at 178.
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psychotherapist) can more reasonably predict what will happen with the disclosed
information, and build a stronger relationship on that mutual understanding. As the
United States Supreme Court noted in regard to the attorney-client privilege, the
purpose of the privilege is only fulfilled if “the attorney and client [can] predict
with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.”214
Once this foundation is set, any compelled disclosures under one of the exceptions
to the privilege is less likely to destroy the relationship because the patient was
aware of the possibility of disclosure – there was no deception and therefore no
violation of the trust.215
Some scholars have suggested that the dangerous-patient exceptions should not
apply unless the patient has been given explicit warning that the threats will not be
kept confidential.216 The ethical duty of confidentiality under the American
Psychological Association includes the requirement for the psychotherapist to
disclose “the relevant limitations on confidentiality” at the beginning of
treatment.217 Therefore, informing the patient about the rights (and the limits of
those rights) under the evidentiary privilege would not put an unnecessary strain on
the therapeutic relationship, and can help to preserve the relationship.
By analogy, some scholars were concerned that the Tarasoff disclosures would
lead to more dangerous people because those individuals would be deterred from
seeking mental health treatment.218 However, through the proper warnings during
treatment, it appears that patients and the mental health professionals can continue
a relationship.219 While testifying in a court on a public record is vastly different
than a therapist disclosing the otherwise confidential information to an authorized
person, there is hope that the Maine psychotherapist-patient privilege will remain
strong, while still providing protection to potential victims if the patient is given
adequate warning that any compelled disclosure is not meant as a sign of betrayal.
In addition, any threat made against another person after this warning can be
considered serious, permitting the psychotherapist to disclose under Tarasoff.
While notice is important, it is necessary to recognize that the warning will
influence the future therapeutic relationship.220 While some professionals advise
to give notice at the beginning of treatment, others suggest withholding the warning
until a threat has been made.221 In this scenario, the patient will have one bite of
the apple, so to speak, before a therapist may need to testify against him. This
benefits the psychotherapist relationship because the patient is not burdened with
the idea of disclosure prior to revealing his violent intentions.
214. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
215. Ralph Slovenko, Comment, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375, 395
(1975) (“Trust---not absolute confidentiality---is the cornerstone of psychotherapy. Talking about a
patient or writing about him without his knowledge or consent would be a breach of trust. But imposing
control where self-control breaks down is not a breach of trust when it is not deceptive. And it is not
necessary to be deceptive.”).
216. Brian P. McKeever, Contours and Chaos: A Proposal for Courts to Apply the "Dangerous
Patient" Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 34 N.M. L. REV. 109, 137 (2004).
217. APA Duty of Confidentiality, supra note 39.
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 892-93.
221. Klinka, supra note 29 at 891-92.
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However, this approach would require the psychotherapists to have a serious
talk about the limits of confidentiality after the therapeutic relationship has been
established. This conversation alone could impact the future of the relationship
because the patient might believe the psychotherapist was not upfront with the
patient from the beginning. In addition, if a dangerous patient were going to act
after a single threat, it would be against public policy to disregard that serious
comment because the psychotherapist waited to inform the patient of his rights.
B. No Other Reasonable Way to Avert the Harm
Even if the patient is adequately warned about the limits of the privilege, the
psychotherapist-patient relationship should still be protected. Psychotherapy still
serves important public and private interests, interests that should not be entirely
set aside simply because patients appear dangerous. As the Jaffee footnote
suggests, the court should not use the dangerous-patient exception unless there is
no other reasonable way to avert the harm.222 When applying the broad exception
of § 7005, the value of the therapeutic relationship should be ever-present in the
court’s consideration. If the imminent harm can be averted by other means, those
avenues should be explored before a therapist is compelled to testify.
One avenue that should always be explored before the application of a
dangerous-patient exception is the Tarasoff duty to disclose. If speaking with the
potential victim or the police quells the threatened harm, there is no need for the
therapist to testify in court. Generally, if there is a threat of harm against a third
party, the potential victim can find protection through realms other than compelling
a psychotherapist to testify. Therefore, a § 7005 exception should only be used
when disclosure is the only way to protect an individual from imminent harm.
If after trying to alleviate the potential harm through other means, the potential
victim is still in need of protection, compelling a psychotherapist to testify at a
hearing that can offer such protection is appropriate. For example, in the
Donaldson case,223 the psychotherapist informed the police about the threat, and the
potential victim was made aware of the threat, but even with this knowledge, the
threat remained imminent. When the potential victim appealed to the court for
relief via the PFA statute, the court appropriately used its discretion to offer her
protection.224
C. A Psychotherapist Should Only be Compelled to Testify in a
Hearing that can Reasonably Avert the Harm
The original intent of the dangerous-patient exception, as stated in the Jaffee
footnote, is to compel otherwise confidential disclosures to avert imminent harm.225
Considering this intent, the only appropriate venue for a dangerous-patient
exception in Maine is in testimonial hearings that can reasonably avert the
threatened harm, such as Protection from Abuse and bail hearings.
222.
223.
J.).
224.
225.

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996).
Donaldson v. Donaldson, No. PA-13-287 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Aug. 16, 2013) (Douglas,
Id.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.
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A Protection from Abuse (PFA) order is available to a person when a family or
household member attempts or commits: 1) physical harm; 2) to force someone to
do something from which they have a right to abstain; 3) put another in fear of
physical harm through threats, harassment or tormenting behavior; 4) to force
another to unlawfully restrict the movement of another person; or 5) to repeatedly
follow or stalk another.226 One purpose for this court-authorized protection is “[t]o
allow family and household members who are victims of domestic abuse to obtain
expeditious and effective protection against further abuse so that the lives of the
non-abusing family or household members are as secure and uninterrupted as
possible.”227 But what happens when the only way to afford this protection is by
peeking into the private communications between the defendant and his/her
psychotherapist?
The dangerous-patient exception can play a critical role in the outcome of both
the defendant’s mental health treatment and the plaintiff’s sense of security. With
proper safeguards in place, the court should be able to compel limited disclosure to
be able to offer the potential victim legal protection from the threatened harm.
The Maine PFA statute provides relief to victims of abuse, which includes
threatened harm.228 The court can grant interim relief through an ex-parte hearing
to provide protection from imminent harm, pending a full hearing.229 After a full
hearing, or a consent agreement, the court can order protection for up to two
years.230 Given that a PFA hearing provides protection against imminent harm, it is
appropriate for a psychotherapist to testify as to the threatened harm in this
situation.
Focusing specifically on Maine cases, the exception would be appropriate if
the therapist’s testimony were the only way to offer legal protection. Compelled
testimony in the case of restraining orders appears to be a “necessary outgrowth of
the therapist’s ‘Tarasoff duty to protect potential victims from harm.’”231 This is
because offering their knowledge in a court of law to secure protection is not an
unreasonable approach when a life is on the line.
Another testimonial hearing that would be appropriate for a dangerous-patient
exception is the bail hearing. If an incarcerated person poses an imminent threat to
another, the court has the ability to immediately deter that harm by keeping the
individual in jail. However, other than bail hearings, the dangerous-patient
exception should not be used in criminal law.232
First, the dangerous-patient exception was born out of the idea of averting
harm, and the purpose of a criminal trial is to punish; second, given the time delays
226. 19-A MRSA § 4002(1)(A-F) (2012 & Supp. 2013). (Another avenue for protection in Maine is
Protection from Harassment, which extends beyond family or household members. 337-A M.R.S. §
4651. Looking beyond the scope of Maine’s rules, this theory could be applied to any protective
hearing).
227. 19-A MRSA § 4001(2) (2012).
228. 19-A MRSA § 4002(1)(B) (2012 & Supp. 2013).
229. 19-A MRSA § 4006(2) (2012 & Supp. 2013).
230. 19-A MRSA § 4007(1), (2) (2012 & Supp. 2013).
231. Paruch, supra note 30 at 395 (quoting George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to
the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The “Tarasoff Duty” and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV.
33, 47 (1999)).
232. See United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
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between the incident and the trial, the harm has likely passed by the time the
testimonial privilege can be waived by a dangerous-patient exception.233
Furthermore, a patient who made a threat against another during a psychotherapy
session is “not likely to actually commit the act once court proceedings have
begun.”234 With this in mind, civil protection order cases or bail hearings are the
only appropriate context for the psychotherapist to prevent the harm from
occurring.
However, even if the hearing has the power to prevent imminent harm, the
exception should not be used if there is other evidence that would support a finding
of abuse and reasonable fear. Therefore, the court should be awarded the discretion
to conduct an in camera review of the information before it becomes public
knowledge to assess if the confidential information is relevant and necessary to the
issuance of protection.
D. The Psychotherapist’s Testimony Should be Limited to Only the Information
Needed to Prevent the Imminent Harm
Finally, even if a psychotherapist is compelled to testify to offer protection in a
limited situation, there are steps available to the court to limit and protect this
information. Maine’s statute 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005 is particularly concerning
because LCSW patients are exposed to an unrestricted exception that has the
potential to go far beyond the intent of Maine’s lawmakers. For example,
therapist’s testimony about threatened harm can easily spin out of control, and
require disclosure of personal and irrelevant information, if the LCSW’s are
required to give the reasons the therapist believed the threat to be credible in the
first place. Therefore, a court should limit the testimony to only what is strictly
necessary to offer protection.235
In most cases, the psychotherapist should only be permitted to testify to the
threat conveyed in the psychotherapy session. This information is enough to
satisfy the PFA statute as well as a judge in a bail hearing if the patient
communicates a threat of violence against another and the potential victim is put in
reasonable fear that the patient will follow through on that threat.236 Therefore,
only the psychotherapist’s testimony to the statement made, the statement that
would be necessary to report under a Tarasoff duty, would be permitted. However,
testimony that explores the reasons why the psychotherapist reported under the
Tarasoff duty would go too far.
If there is a debate as to whether the psychotherapist’s testimony is probative,
the court should conduct an in camera review of the testimony to verify its
necessity before the therapist is examined on the public record. This policy returns
to the fact that the psychotherapist-patient relationship is one the court should look
to protect if possible. The courtroom should not be a way for litigators to fish for
evidence locked beneath the psychotherapist-patient privilege. This exception
should only push the privilege aside when a threat of imminent harm is present, and
233.
234.
235.
236.

Paruch, supra note 30 at 393.
Parsio, supra note 55 at 650.
McKeever, supra note 216 at 147.
19-A M.R.S § 4002(1)(E) (2012 & Supp. 2013).
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it should only be used to the extent necessary to provide protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
Maine LCSWs face an uncertain privilege; as long as 32 M.R.S.A. § 7005
provides a conditional privilege that conflicts with the Maine Rules of Evidence,
the balance between protecting the patient and protecting the public is askew. As it
stands, a LCSW patient is exposed—while the duty of confidentiality protects the
patient to a certain extent, the court can compel a LCSW to disclose the patient’s
innermost thoughts, urges and conflicts on the public record at any time in any
testimonial hearing. In response, the psychotherapist relationship may suffer, and
the patient may not receive the best mental health treatment. Therefore, the statute
needs to be amended to be clear about the protections offered under Maine law to
LCSW patients.
Until the statute is amended, Maine courts should exercise their discretion to
protect the intent and purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. If a court is
inclined to use the statute to provide protection to a potential victim, it should only
be when the patient has actual knowledge of the rights and exceptions under the
privilege, when there is no other reasonable way to avert the harm, when the
LCSWs testimony would be in a hearing that can reasonably avert the harm, and
when the LCSWs testimony is limited to only the information needed to prevent
the harm.

